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SHOULD THE LEFT DISSENT?
PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A
DIVIDED NATION. By Robert L. Tsai.1 W. W. Norton &
Company, 2019. Pp. 276. $27.95 (Cloth).
Nelson Tebbe2
I.
When a political community is as polarized as America is
today, people on the left often will be unable to protect core
principles, such as equal membership, basic liberty, and
distributive justice. They will find themselves thwarted by
opponents who are unable or unwilling to embrace an egalitarian
vision. (And conservatives will face a converse challenge, of
course.) This situation is difficult, to say the least. Not only is
political polarization unpleasant, but it can impede the
functioning of democratic self-governance.
In his creative and beautifully articulated book, Practical
Equality: Forging Justice in a Divided Nation, Robert L. Tsai
suggests a way forward. To his main question, “[w]hat is to be
done to confront injustice when the timing doesn’t seem right or
the odds are stacked against you?,” Tsai responds that egalitarians
should pursue “equality by other means” (p. 3). Practical equality
describes a method or strategy of embracing second-best solutions
when ideal outcomes are unattainable. Constitutional concepts
that can approximate equality include procedural due process,
rationality review, the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, and freedom of expression. Pursing these
alternatives is smart strategy, for Tsai, but it is also required by
“constitutional duty” or moral obligation (p. 7). Moreover,
practical equality can produce consensus, or at least majority
support, for an outcome, partly because its techniques do not
1. Professor of Law, American University.
2. Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Micah Schwartzman for
comments on an earlier version.
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require a finding of bias on the part of government
decisionmakers.3
Tsai’s first example is President Trump’s signature travel
ban. The outlines of this story are well known. Soon after he was
inaugurated in January of 2017, Trump fulfilled his campaign
promise to effectuate a “total and complete shutdown” on Muslim
travel to the United States.4 He signed an executive order that
effectively excluded travel into the country by citizens of several
Muslim-majority nations, among other measures.5 Chaos ensued
at airports and other ports of entry, lawyers brought challenges,
and courts quickly invalidated the executive order. Shortly
thereafter, Trump issued a revised ban, which also was quickly
invalidated.6 Courts offered different rationales for these
judgments. Some judges held that the travel ban violated
immigration statutes, others found violations of due process, and
still others decided that Trump had discriminated against Muslims
in violation of the Establishment Clause.7 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court upheld the third and final version of the travel
ban.8 Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the executive’s
decisions on immigration issues deserved deference, and that the
administration’s findings were sufficient to satisfy that deferential
review, irrespective of any impermissible bias against Muslims
that might have motivated Trump, who was the sole lawmaker in
this situation.9
3. On consensus, see infra note 44. Tsai takes equality law as he finds it, probably
for pragmatic reasons. See, e.g., p. 81 (“Who exactly was doing the discriminating [in
McCleskey]? . . . One couldn’t simply say ‘the system,’ at least not without dramatically
altering the way that equality questions had long been resolved.”). Another strategy would
be to imagine a different and more substantive equal protection jurisprudence, one that
would protect vulnerable groups against government policies that have a disparate impact
on them. That would allow courts to rule against the government without having to find
that officials acted with a discriminatory motive. Cf. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Based State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1113-14 (1997) (arguing that the equal protection requirement of discriminatory
purpose may be an example of “preservation through transformation”).
4. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2417 (2018).
5. Executive Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry
Into the United States. 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017).
6. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82
Fed. Reg. 13209 (2017).
7. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (due process); Hawaii
v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (statutory grounds); Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (Establishment Clause).
8. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
9. Id. at 2420–21.
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How should a practical egalitarian handle such a case? Tsai
notes that a group of law professors argued that the travel ban was
motivated by religious animus and therefore violated the
Establishment Clause (p. 10 & n.3).10 Tsai does not endorse that
approach.11 Instead, he prefers the ruling of the Ninth Circuit,
which reasoned that the travel ban violated due process in various
ways, such as by altering the rights of green card holders without
giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard (pp. 75-76).12
The Ninth Circuit’s decision was “textbook use of alternative
means to promote equality” and it was productive because it
“repeatedly forced the administration to modify a deeply unequal
policy,” so that ultimately three countries were dropped from the
ban and several exemptions were created (p. 79). Anything more
would be too much to ask of courts, Tsai suggests, because judges
“can’t stop ethnonationalist agendas on their own”—that can only
be done through raw politics (p. 80).
Tsai’s argument has significant power. Where full equality
cannot be achieved because of implacable opposition, it makes
good sense to support rationales that can relieve suffering to some
degree. Think of Justice Kennedy’s decision to protect LGBT
people against discrimination using rational basis review without
deciding whether they constituted a suspect class, at an early
moment when taking that step likely would have sparked
opposition that would have been significant and probably
disabling.13 Moreover, second-best solutions can sometimes pave
the way for first-best solutions. These reminders are particularly
valuable in our historical moment, when egalitarians are likely to
face significant obstacles, particularly in courts. In issuing them,
Tsai is building on an argument for constitutional borrowing that
we made together in an earlier article.14 I am delighted to be

10. For the Supreme Court version of the amicus brief, see Brief of Constitutional
Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 2018 WL
1605673 (March 30, 2018). I was one of the principal authors of that brief, which we filed
in several courts.
11. He suggests that although it would be easy to become “enamored” with the
straightforward equality argument, “that’s a mistake” because serious arguments existed
on the other side, including the government’s contention that the travel ban was necessary
to protect national security (p. 3).
12. Discussing Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
13. Cf. pp. 131-32, offering Romer v. Evans, 519 U.S. 620 (1996), as “the perfect
roadmap for equality by other means.”
14. See p. 239 n.37, citing Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing,
108 MICH. L. REV. 459 (2010).
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associated with Tsai in this way, though I take no credit for his
work in this book, which is entirely original, characteristically
careful, and admirably constructive.
Yet there is another way that egalitarians could respond to
nonideal conditions, one that receives less attention in Practical
Equality—they could dissent. Tsai is focused almost exclusively
on the judiciary in this work, and his unit of analysis is a court,
taken as a decisionmaking body. That focus makes sense given his
audience, which seems to include both lawyers on the left who are
seeking outcomes in litigation and members of the political
community who are urging and evaluating judicial action. But a
consequence of that choice is that he does not separately address
sympathetic judges, and he does not centrally consider what their
responsibilities or best strategies might be, when faced with
conservative colleagues who will outnumber them or appellate
courts who will overrule them. Should egalitarian judges who find
themselves unable to achieve ideal outcomes also engage in
practical equality, or should they dissent?
Think furthermore about constitutional actors outside of
courts—in
legislatures,
administrative
agencies,
local
governments, nonprofit organizations, educational institutions,
media outlets, social movements, and political mobilizations.
Egalitarians in these settings also regularly make constitutional
arguments, and they regularly face obstacles. Should they seek
equality by other means, or should they forcefully urge an
alternative constitutional vision of what full and equal
membership in the democratic community looks like in a society
that is well ordered and just?
To ask these questions is not to answer them. Likely, the
effectiveness of various constitutional strategies will vary by
context. But considering these issues opens up an important
discussion about the comparative merits and demerits of different
approaches—a discussion that I imagine Tsai will welcome. One
of these approaches is “equality by other means”; another is
dissent.
II.
A scenario in which it might be better for constitutional
actors to dissent is where disagreement is necessary to manage the
range of acceptable arguments and outcomes. In the situation I
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am imagining, embracing a second-best solution makes
egalitarian arguments seem extreme or radical. That cost may be
too great, especially where the outcome is not in question because
the opposition is certain to prevail, but perhaps also in some
situations where the outcome is uncertain.
On this view, there is at any given moment a range of
constitutional positions that carry authority or weight with the
relevant decisionmaker. Outside that range, positions are
considered unthinkable or at least unserious. Theorists sometimes
refer to this category of recognized arguments as the Overton
Window.15 Jack Balkin describes something similar when he
argues that some constitutional arguments count as “on the wall”
at any given historical moment, whereas others are “off the
wall.”16 Interpretations can move back and forth between
unacceptable and acceptable, unthinkable and thinkable.
Moreover, the size of the window can be expanded or contracted,
and the entire window can move leftward or rightward, to use
crude political terms. The mechanisms by which these changes
occur are complex, contingent, and at least partially extralegal.
Regardless, the key insight is that the breadth and location of the
range of colorable interpretations can have profound effect on
constitutional conflicts.
Where the outcome of a particular dispute is certain to be
inegalitarian, shirking from dissent can have deleterious effects on
the acceptability of equality arguments. It can isolate those
constitutional interpretations, casting them as immoderate. Over
time, that impression can prove meaningful, if not on in litigation
itself than in the wider sphere of constitutional politics where the
Court is the dominant player.
Under conditions of political polarization, moreover,
conservative interpretations are likely to shift rightward (just as
liberal positions are shifting leftward, though not necessarily
15. See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
363, 393–94 (2015) (“Joseph Overton observed that in a given public policy area, such as
education, only a relatively narrow range of potential policies will be considered politically
acceptable.”) (citing The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR.
FOR PUB. POL’Y, www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow).
16. Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge
Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challengewent-main-stream/258040 (describing how arguments once considered “off the wall”
become “on the wall” through contestation and argument).
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symmetrically).17 If egalitarians on the Court respond by
embracing second-best solutions that are less likely to be divisive
and more likely to win converts among conservatives, that could
promote a rightward shift of the range of acceptable outcomes. By
contrast, a practice of persistent dissent could stabilize the range
of recognized positions, or at least force it to expand rather than
simply shift.
Outside courts, egalitarians on the left face choices that are
analogous though not identical. If they know that they will be
unable to obtain a particular outcome—an assumption I will relax
in a minute—then pursuing equality by other means may come
with a cost. Voicing strong dissent, by contrast, might help to
preserve plausibility for positions on questions of justice that then
will have a better chance of carrying the day sometime in the
future.
As an example, return to the travel ban case.18 There, the
Supreme Court upheld (the third and final version of) Trump’s
restriction on travel from certain countries to the United States.
Writing for a narrow majority of five votes, Chief Justice Roberts
applied a deferential standard of review to the executive action,
insulating it against the claim that Trump had acted out of
animosity toward Muslims in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Because the case concerned immigration and national
security, that is, Roberts reasoned that the travel ban should be
upheld if it could be supported by legitimate national security
concerns, independent of any unconstitutional motives, and he
found that it could be supported that way.19 He therefore put to
one side the history of statements by Trump that strongly
suggested that his effort to craft a travel ban was driven by
unconstitutional bias against Muslims.20
Tsai seems to suggest that the majority opinion,
“disappointing though it may have been,” was the best we could
have hoped for from courts (pp. 79-80). By the time the Supreme
Court ruled, the due process defects had been ameliorated, if not

17. Cf. Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 915, 918 (2018) (analogizing to “asymmetric polarization” in politics).
18. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
19. Id. at 2420–21.
20. See id. at 2416–18 (describing Trump’s statements regarding the travel ban,
including that he intended to effect a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering
the United States”).
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completely eliminated, and without the need to accuse the
president of acting out of antireligious animus.
Yet imagine what the effect would have been if some of the
dissenters—say, Justices Breyer and Kagan—had adopted this
rationale in a concurrence or even joined the majority opinion. As
it was, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, wrote a dissent in
which he argued that the administration may well have been
applying the ban’s many exemptions in a manner that bolstered
the animus conclusion, and he called for a remand to explore that
evidence further.21 However, he also said clearly that if a remand
were impossible, he would set aside the travel ban on the basis of
the president’s statements, as documented by Justice Sotomayor
in her separate dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.22 If Justices
Breyer and Kagan had not dissented, they would have isolated
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, and they would have further
marginalized the argument that Trump in fact promulgated the
final travel ban as part of a sustained effort to exclude Muslims,
exactly as he had promised during his campaign.23
After all, the Ninth Circuit’s due process opinion was not the
only source of constitutional resistance to the travel ban, nor was
it the most prominent or persistent one. The Fourth Circuit also
repeatedly found against Trump’s program, and it did so on
straightforward Establishment Clause grounds, holding that the
president likely had acted out of “animus toward Islam.”24 It’s far
from clear—to me, at least—that the administration revised the
travel ban solely in response to the Ninth Circuit’s due process
ruling, when the Fourth Circuit had also been holding that the ban
likely violated the Constitution. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s
later rulings, against versions two and three of the travel ban,
abandoned the due process argument and substituted statutory
21. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
22. Id. (“If this Court must decide the question without this further litigation, I
would, on balance, find the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a
website taken down only after the President issued the two executive orders preceding the
Proclamation, along with the other statements also set forth in Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside.”).
23. This is not to say that Justice Breyer’s opinion did not already fracture the
dissent. It is to say only that failing to dissent would have done even more to promote the
impression that Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg were outliers.
24. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 257 (4th Cir. 2018) (en
banc); see also Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 597 (4th Cir. 2017)
(finding the plaintiffs likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause
challenge to the second version of the travel ban).
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grounds.25 So it’s possible that some of the credit that Tsai claims
for practical equality should actually go to first-best
egalitarianism, rather than to second-best approaches.26
Contrast the travel ban case to Masterpiece Cakeshop, which
was decided the same month and which also turned on a claim of
religious animosity.27 There, the Court ruled for Jack Phillips, a
Christian baker who refused to provide a wedding cake for the
celebration of Charlie Craig and David Mullins, who were
planning a celebration of their marriage. The Court reasoned, in
part, that Colorado officials had relied on antireligious “hostility”
when they ruled in the couple’s favor, because two state officials
had made remarks about religion that the Court considered to be
disparaging.28 I want to put aside the merits of that controversial
holding and focus instead on the votes of Justices Kagan and
Breyer. They joined the majority because, as Justice Kagan
explained, they agreed that Colorado officials had not showed
Phillips “neutral and respectful consideration.”29 Their signatures
made the decision 7-2, with only Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg
dissenting.
Justices Kagan and Breyer might have been pursuing a form
of practical equality. They could well have counted noses after
oral argument and concluded that Jack Phillips was going to
prevail. (Certainly, I had that sense on reading the transcript.)
And they might further have calculated that a narrow decision
based on the unusual evidence of bias in Colorado was preferable
to a broad holding that religious objectors have a presumptive
25. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 761 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the second
version of the travel ban violated the Immigration and Naturalization Act); Hawaii v.
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding that the third version of the travel ban also
violated statutory immigration law).
26. Admittedly, several of the improvements Tsai mentions were procedural, but
several others appeared designed to defend against the accusation of religious
discrimination. Adding North Korea and Venezuela to the list of banned countries, in
particular, blunted the force of the argument that every country on the list was virtually
entirely Muslim. That “the President’s inclusion of North Korea and Venezuela does little
to mitigate the anti-Muslim animus that permeates the” travel ban doesn’t mean those
additions weren’t designed to do just that. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2442 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
27. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018).
28. Id. at 1731. Whether the comments were in fact disparaging has been questioned.
Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133,
138–43 (2018).
29. Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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right to exemptions from core civil rights laws. Rather than
dissenting, then, they sought to shape a majority opinion that was
as narrow as possible—Justice Kagan even wrote separately,
joined by Justice Breyer, to urge an interpretation of the majority
opinion that avoided one particularly broad reading.30 Even if that
wasn’t exactly equality by other means—Craig and Mullins lost,
after all—it could have counted as practical equality, because it
might have helped to blunt an opinion that otherwise would have
been more damaging.
Yet the strategy came with a cost. Making the Masterpiece
vote 7-2 isolated the strong dissent by Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Sotomayor. It marginalized their perspective, which
otherwise might have drawn four votes. That dynamic may well
influence the Court when a wedding vendor case returns to the
Court, as it surely will, or indeed whenever the Court next
confronts any similar tension between religious freedom and
equality law. Now, that cost may be overborne by the benefits of
the strategy I am imaging for Justices Breyer and Kagan. My only
point here is that when we are evaluating options in a nonideal
world, our evaluation should be comparative—it ought to include
the option of dissent.
A pattern is emerging, at least in religious freedom cases.
Justices Breyer and Kagan are forging a position, or a set of
positions, somewhere between the majority on the right and the
dissenting justices to their left. Of course, it is possible that they
are doing this for entirely principled reasons, and with no thought
for judicial strategy. But it is also possible that Breyer and Kagan
believe their approach has instrumental advantages even on a
Court where Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice
Kavanaugh, and where Chief Justice Roberts now sits near the
center of the balance of power—a center that has shifted
appreciably to the right.31
Perhaps they believe that they can slowly bring Roberts
along by building trust and solidarity with him incrementally—in
a series of cases rather than all at once. Guided by the examples
of how Justices Souter or Kennedy became less conservative over
the course of their judicial careers, Justices Breyer and Kagan
30. Id. at 1733–34. For a different rejection of that reading, see Lawrence G. Sager
& Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 171 (2019).
31. Of course, it is also conceivable that Justices Breyer and Kagan are acting out of
some complicated mix of principled and pragmatic rationales.
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may believe that they can sway Roberts through force of reason
and moral suasion, if and only if they can avoid sparking a
defensive reaction. But what if they are wrong? What if Roberts
turns out to be a very different thinker from Souter or Kennedy,
sitting on a transformed Court, at a markedly distinct political and
historical moment? That possibility has to be considered.
III.
Tsai has addressed some related matters, and he’s done so
with characteristic elegance and exactitude. Most importantly, he
rejects the strategies of “deferral” and “appeasement” and he
distinguishes them from practical equality (p. 6).
Deferral means putting off equality enforcement so that
public opinion and cultural attitudes have time to adjust, and so
“legal rulings seem more democratic and are less likely to be
openly defied” (p. 4). That approach sounds reasonable, in the
nonideal world that he addresses, but Tsai is quite skeptical. He
believes the costs of delay are often underestimated and generally
too high for those suffering from unjust practices (p. 5).32
Moreover, the strategy introduces considerable uncertainty,
because attitudes may never progress sufficiently to allow
enforcement (p. 5). Referring once more to the example of the
travel ban, Tsai argues that travelers and especially refugees
should not suffer uncertainty or indefinite postponement (pp. 45).
Why these costs are greater than the downsides of practical
equality is not completely clear. Those who did not benefit from
the administration’s adjustments to the travel ban—adjustments
that Tsai credits to the Ninth Circuit’s due process ruling—are
now permanently deprived of relief. Maybe Tsai is correct that
their suffering, summed over time, is comparatively less than the
harm experienced by all those initially subject to the ban, if it was
allowed to persist for a temporary period. But that calculation is
complicated.
Appeasement, for Tsai, means “openly adopting the
objections of your opponents as your own” in order to achieve a
measure of recognition for egalitarianism rather than none at all.
32. See also p. 127 (criticizing the Court’s deferral in Korematsu, which was not
released until after the president announced closure of the camps); id. (“[D]eferral is like
a lousy rerun. We’ve seen it before and it never gets better.”).
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(pp. 5-6; see also pp. 35-36) Tsai is wary of this strategy as well,
because he thinks that colluding with opponents can work to
perpetuate injustice. What he means, I think, is that appeasers aim
to neutralize the aggression of another but they end up with the
opposite effect—they unintentionally energize their opponent (p.
7).33 As Micah Schwartzman and I have put the point, the term
appeasement usually refers to a situation where one side accedes
to another’s demands with the intent of disarming them, “but
where that concession has the self-defeating effect of
emboldening the other.”34
Turning once more to the travel ban, Tsai argues that it
would have been a mistake to concede that refugees could be
blocked, even if that were the price for invalidating the
prohibition on other travelers (p. 6). Nor would it have been wise
to allow an emergency exception that made discrimination against
Muslims permissible for reasons of national security (p. 6). Yet
the majority opinion did effectively create a national security
exception. So why Tsai equivocates on the wisdom of the travel
ban decision (pp. 79-80) is somewhat puzzling.
More generally, distinguishing practical equality from
appeasement can sometimes be difficult. On the one hand, certain
second-best solutions carry little risk of empowering
discriminators. When the Ninth Circuit invalidated the travel ban
on procedural grounds, for instance, Trump’s hand was not
strengthened (pp. 75-76). On the other hand, however, some
instances of practical equality are harder to distinguish from
appeasement. In United States Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court
invalidated a provision of the Food Stamp Act that excluded
people who lived with anyone unrelated to them.35 The Court held
that the provision was not rationally related to the prevention of
fraud. Tsai cheers this outcome because it did something to
protect indigent people, who were more likely to have roommates
from outside their families (p. 110). But was it appeasement?

33. “[T]he flaw with appeasement is that justice in half measures could leave future
generations worse off” (p. 7).
34. Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Against Establishment Clause Concession,
TAKE CARE (Mar. 1, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-establishment-clauseconcession. We explicitly disclaimed any historical reference carried by the term
appeasement.
35. United States Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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Moreno was decided in the early 1970s, a time when
constitutional actors were engaged in a serious debate over
whether and how to protect poor people from government actions
that worsened one of the most significant sources of inequality in
America—and indeed over what inequality on the basis of wealth
and income even entailed, as a matter of political morality and
constitutional justice. In decisions like Moreno, the Court stopped
short of declaring indigency to be a suspect classification,
government use of which would have triggered a presumption of
unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.36 Did that
decision embolden those who wished to insulate market ordering
from judicial oversight and constitutional critique? Did it
contribute to the contemporary situation, in which indigent
Americans find themselves without constitutional resources for
arguing against historic levels of distributive injustice?37 Those
questions seem hard to answer, and I am not sure how Tsai would
respond.38
IV.
In response to this moment of political polarization, a trope
seems to be emerging. Principled positions are characterized as
divisive because they tend to stimulate defensive reactions that
are equally strong, whereas pragmatic approaches promote
reconciliation and offer a pathway to productive action. Tsai sets
up a similar tension between principle and practicality39 and he is

36. See Bertrall Ross, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and
the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 341 (2016) (“For a brief seven-year period in the late
1960s and early 1970s, classifications on the basis of wealth stood on the same level as
classifications on the basis on the basis of race—traditionally disfavored and subject to
heightened judicial scrutiny. But after the addition of four conservative Justices in the early
1970s, the Court reversed course and ultimately determined that wealth was not a suspect
classification and that the poor were not a suspect class.”). A key decision in the reversal,
handed down the same year as Moreno, was San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
37. But see Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution,
94 B.U.L. REV. 671 (2014) (exhuming an American constitutional tradition supporting
socio-economic rights).
38. For an example that Tsai considers appeasement, consider the decision by some
LGBT supporters to advocate for civil unions in the 1990s and 2000s (pp. 36–37). Did that
decision encourage the impression that something short of civil marriage was all same-sex
couples were entitled to, or was it a pragmatic step forward at a moment in history when
marriage equality was not attainable?
39. See, e.g., p. 6 (describing a “tussle between principle and realism”); p. 11 (arguing
that practical equality “would best balance principle and realism”), p. 91 (describing
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not alone—he has distinguished company.40 In his book, however,
Tsai introduces an inventive twist, arguing that the principle of
equality can be pursued without principled argument, by using
other constitutional means to achieve ends that are the same or
similar.
But principle does not work that way, or at least it need not
work that way. People use inductive reasoning to identify values
or commitments that fairly abstract from more particular
judgments that have withstood examination over time. These
abstract commitments, or principles, are not rules that rigidly
dictate outcomes.41 People use them to deduce solutions to
contemporary problems, but that process is always complex and
contestable. Moreover, principles don’t suggest outcomes alone—
they work together with concrete judgments, or precedents, to
form a coherent set of convictions. Where the Constitution is
involved, those convictions include text, history, structure, and
past decisions that have come to be regarded as authoritative.42 In
this manner, interpreters work toward solutions to contemporary
problems that fit together not only with principles, but also with
precedents and pragmatic considerations. And this way of
thinking is dynamic, so that every element is revisable, including
principles.
Understood like that, constitutional interpretation does not
necessarily pit principle against practical considerations. To say
that it does is to dismiss the power of dissent prematurely, calling
it rigid, without appreciating its dynamism or contingency. Many
of the decisions that Tsai praises throughout his book could be
understood as consistent with principle, on such a view. For
instance, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the travel ban case was

equality by other means as “both principled and pragmatic”), p. 39 (“pragmatism shies
away from fixed principles and closed systems”).
40. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE UNNECESSARY CONFLICT BETWEEN GAY RIGHTS
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 1, 4 (forthcoming, 2020) (“Principles are a distraction, which
make each side’s claims seem more uncompromisable than they are . . . . Lawyers are
trained to think about conflict resolution by devising abstract principles that should cover
all future cases, and which incidentally entail that their side wins. But this is not the only
way to think about conflict. Sometimes, the right thing to do is not to follow a principle,
but to accurately discern the interests at stake and cobble together an approach that gives
some weight to each of those interests.”).
41. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–23 (1977)
(distinguishing principles from rules).
42. This paragraph draws on NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN
EGALITARIAN AGE 25–36 (2017).
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not unprincipled—rather, it emphasized the importance of
procedural due process (as well as substantive due process). That
the court may also have responded to the political difficulties that
an Establishment Clause opinion finding religious animus may
have faced in the Ninth Circuit itself, or on certiorari review, does
not mean that its opinion did not implement the norm of due
process, an important constitutional ideal. Nor was the Moreno
decision any more practical than it was principled—after all, the
conviction that government may only coerce people on the basis
of reasons that are public in the sense that they are accessible to
those coerced is basic to liberal-egalitarian democracy.
Lawyers on the left should welcome compromise in the many
instances in which it can be supported by considerations of justice
as applied to the real world. But where it cannot, compromise in
itself may not be worth pursuing.43 Actually, I do not think Tsai
himself suggests otherwise.44 But others who value the reduction
of today’s political tension for its own sake may be constructing
agreement on an unfirm foundation. Democratic principles can
hold the United States together, and the United States is not likely
to be held together without them.

43. See Nelson Tebbe, Conscience and Equality, 31 J. C. R. & ECON. DEVEL. 1, 64–
66 (2018) (distinguishing between two forms of compromise, reasoned and unreasoned,
and raising concerns about the second). There is a developed literature about compromise
in political theory; I plan to address it in upcoming work.
44. Tsai does sometimes seem to value consensus in itself (pp. 70–71, 75). Practical
egalitarians want courts to make the right decisions, but they may not need consensus to
do that, and there does not seem to be a necessary reason why consensus would have
independent value, especially within a court.

